Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream



Section 9.3 Other Voting Systems For Three or More Candidates

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Four Desirable properties of voting systems with 3 or more candidates:

1.) Condorcet winner criterion (pg 333 9th ed)

2.) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (pg 336 9th ed)


3.) Pareto Condition (pg 338 9th ed)

4.) Monotonicity (pg 341 9th ed)

Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

- <u>Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates</u>
 - When there are three or more candidates, it is more unlikely to have a candidate win with a majority vote.
 - Many other voting methods exist, consisting of reasonable ways to choose a winner; however, they all have shortcomings.
 - We will examine four more popular voting systems for three or more candidates:
- <u>Four voting systems</u>, along with their shortcomings:
 - 1. Plurality Voting and the Condorcet Winning Criterion
 - 2. The Borda Count and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
 - 3. Sequential Pairwise Voting and the Pareto Condition
 - 4. The Hare System and Monotonicity

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Plurality Voting	(V	otin	ıg P	roc	edur	<u>e 1 of 4)</u>	
Example							
A group of twelve st hold a keg party (K) preference rankings group make if they u	, wat are s	ch a r hown	novie belo	e (M), w. W	, or stu	dy (S). Their	
Number of Students	3	3	2	2	2		
First choice	К	Μ	S	Κ	S		
Second choice	Μ	K	Μ	S	Κ		
Third choice	S	S	Κ	Μ	Μ		

Answer is not provide, however you should be able to solve the example.


Plurality Voting and the Condorcet Winning Criterion

- Example: 2000 Presidential Election (Plurality fails CWC.)
 - <u>Condorcet Winner Criterion</u> (CWC) is satisfied if either is true:
 - 1. If there is no Condorcet winner (often the case) or -
 - 2. If the winner of the election is also the Condorcet winner
 - This election came down to which of Bush or Gore would carry Florida.
 <u>Result</u>: George W. Bush won by a few hundred votes.
 - Gore, however, was considered the Condorcet winner:

It is assumed if Al Gore was pitted against any one of the other three candidates, (Bush, Buchanan, Nader), Gore would have won.



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Borda Count (Voting Procedure 2 of 4) Example


100 members of the University Marching Band are trying to decide in which of 4 different bowl games they will march. the preference schedule is given:

# of votes	49	48	3
1 st	R	Н	С
2 nd	Н	0	Η
3rd	С	С	0
4 th	0	R	R


R: Rose Bowl H: Hula Bowl C: Cotton Bowl O: Orange Bowl

In which bowl will the University Band March if votes are counted by the Borda Count method? (use a 4, 3, 2, 1 point distribution).

 $\begin{array}{l} R=49(4)+48(1)+3(1)=247\\ H=48(4)+49(3)+3(3)=348\\ C=3(4)+49(2)+48(2)=206\\ O=48(3)+3(2)+49(1)=199 \end{array}$



Try doing the problem without looking at the answer.





<u>Sequentia</u>	equential Pairwise Voting (Voting Procedure 3 of 4)								
 Seq can The third This rem 	 <u>Sequential Pairwise Voting</u> Sequential pairwise voting starts with an <u>agenda</u> and pits the first candidate against the second in a one-on-one contest. The losers are deleted and the winner then moves on to confront the third candidate in the list, one on one. This process continues throughout the entire <u>agenda</u>, and the one remaining at the end wins. <u>Example</u>: Who would be the winner using the <u>agenda A, B, C, D</u> for the following preference list ballots of three voters? 								
Rank	Numbe	er of Vot	ters (3)	U	e agenda A, B				
First	А	С	В	 and record (with tally marks) who is preferred for each ballot list (column). 					
Second	В	А	D	A vs. B	A vs. C	C va D			
Third	D	В	С	II I	I II	<u>с ю. с</u> (Candidate D		
Fourth	С	D	А		C wins; A is		wins for this		
Differen	t agende	ı can pr	oduce d	deleted. <i>lifferent winn</i>	deleted. ers!	deleted.	agenda.		


Sequential Pairwise Voting (Voting Procedure 3 of 4) Example

Given the agenda: B, C, D, A and the preference schedule in the following figure, who will win the election using sequential pairwise voting?

voting	?			By the given agenda, B competes first
# of votes	5	2	4	against C. B vs C: B get 7 votes.
1^{st}	А	В	С	C get 4 votes B wins; C is eliminated.
2^{nd}	В	С	D	B goes on to compete with the next alternative, D
3 rd	D	А	А	B vs D: B gets 7 votes D gets 4 votes
4^{th}	С	D	В	B wins; D is eliminated
Win	nei	: is	A!	B vs A: B gets 2 votes A gets 9 votes A wins; B is eliminated.







1 st

2nd B A C B

3rd

of

votes

1 st

2nd

3rd

4th

B B D B

C D A C

A C B A

Ċ

Step 2. B now has the fewest 1st place votes → B is eliminated.

Step 3. A now has fewest 1st

C wins!!

place votes and is eliminated!

CBA

Remove B from lists and move others up.

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C A A C

5 4 1

A C

C A

